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Abstract—Timed transaction execution is critical for
various decentralized privacy-preserving applications
powered by blockchain-based smart contract platforms.
Such privacy-preserving smart contract applications need
to be able to securely maintain users’ sensitive inputs off
the blockchain until a prescribed execution time and then
automatically make the inputs available to enable on-chain
execution of the target function at the execution time, even if the
user goes offline. While straight-forward centralized approaches
provide a basic solution to the problem, unfortunately they
are limited to a single point of trust. This paper presents a
new decentralized privacy-preserving transaction scheduling
approach that allows users of Ethereum-based decentralized
applications to schedule transactions without revealing sensitive
inputs before an execution time window selected by the users.
The proposed approach involves no centralized party and
allows users to go offline at their discretion after scheduling a
transaction. The sensitive inputs are privately maintained by a
set of trustees randomly selected from the network enabling the
inputs to be revealed only at the execution time. The proposed
protocol employs secret key sharing and layered encryption
techniques and economic deterrence models to securely protect
the sensitive information against possible attacks including
some trustees destroying the sensitive information or secretly
releasing the sensitive information prior to the execution
time. We demonstrate the attack-resilience of the proposed
approach through rigorous analysis. Our implementation and
experimental evaluation on the Ethereum official test network
demonstrates that the proposed approach is effective and has a
low gas cost and time overhead associated with it.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the age of big data, blockchain [32] has become
a promising technology to enable decentralized protection
of data integrity [18] and ensuring data quality [7]. Any
data stored in a blockchain is backed up and verified
by all the nodes in the network and provides a strong
resilience against attacks that can tamper the integrity of the
data. With this great feature offered by blockchains, recent
implementations of blockchain-based smart contract platforms,
such as Ethereum [46] and NEO [33], have attracted a
large number of developers to build decentralized applications
using smart contracts that avoid the need of a centralized
server to manage and maintain the data [6], [30], [31].
The market cap for the leading smart contract platform,
Ethereum, peaked at $134 billion [15] in 2018 and thousands
of decentralized applications, ranging from social networks to
financial software, have been developed over Ethereum [41].
The Smart Contracts market is estimated to grow at a CAGR
of 32% during the period 2017 to 2023 [40].
A decentralized application may involve one or more
smart contracts and each smart contract may contain multiple
functions that need to be invoked by application users
through transactions. For instance, a sealed-bid auction smart
contract [47] requires bidders to reveal their sealed bids by
invoking a function (e.g., a reveal() function) during a time
window. Similarly, a voting smart contract [30] requires voters
to publish their votes using a vote() function during the voting
time window. Each called function in a smart contract is
executed by the entire blockchain network. Since both function
code and function inputs (i.e., bid or vote) are available on
the blockchain, the function outputs are deterministic and
their correctness can be verified by the network, thus cutting
out centralized middlemen or intermediaries for running these
functions [24].
A key fundamental limitation of existing smart contract
platforms is the lack of support for users to schedule timed
execution of transactions such that their target functions
can be invoked at a later time, even when the users
go offline. For example, if Bob plans to take a week
off work and could not respond to an auction or voting
mechanism implemented on Ethereum during the prescribed
time windows, he needs a mechanism to schedule these
timed transactions by automatically invoking reveal() and
vote() during the time windows. Here, the inputs to these
functions namely the bids and the votes are extremely
sensitive and need to be securely protected until the prescribed
time windows even when Bob is offline. Scheduling timed
execution of functions is common in centralized application
environments. For instance, Boomerang [11] allows users
of Gmail to schedule their emails to be sent when users
have no connection with the Internet. Similarly, Postfity [35]
helps users to schedule messages to be posted onto many
centralized social networks. However, a centralized approach
to supporting timed execution of transactions incurs a single
point of trust and violates the key design principle of
decentralization inherent in blockchain-based smart contract
platforms [43]. In general, the design of timed execution of
transactions in decentralized platforms such as Ethereum is
challenged in two aspects. First, when a transaction invoking
a function is deployed into the network, the invoked function is
executed immediately which makes it difficult to support timed
execution when the user has already gone offline. Another
key challenge arises due to privacy concerns associated with
the input data to the function. To guarantee verifiability
of function outputs, function inputs need be put onto the
blockchain and as a result, both function inputs and outputs
become public to all peers at the time the schedule is
initialized leading to privacy risks with the input data. The
proposed privacy-preserving timed-execution approaches find
numerous applications in high performance computing. For
instance, recent projects such as Golem [2] and iEx.ec [3]
focus on developing decentralized supercomputers and high
performance computing platforms without vendor lock-in.
These solutions leverage the Ethereum as a marketplace
application to link buyers and sellers of computing resources
without requiring an intermediary. When smart contracts
are used to manage and schedule computing tasks in such
platforms, privacy-preserving timed-execution techniques can
effectively protect privacy of sensitive inputs of the scheduled
and in-queue computing tasks.
In this paper, we design and develop a new decentralized
privacy-preserving timed execution mechanism that allows
users of Ethereum-based decentralized platforms to schedule
timed execution of transactions without revealing function
inputs and outputs prior to the execution time selected by the
users. The proposed approach is decentralized and involves
no centralized party and does not include any single point of
trust. After transactions have been scheduled, it requires no
further interaction from users and allows users to go offline
at their discretion. The mechanism does not reveal function
inputs before the execution time window selected by a user as
function inputs are privately maintained by a set of trustees
randomly selected from the network and released only during
the execution time window. The function inputs are protected
through secret share [39] and multi-layer encryption [12] and
possible misbehaviors of the trustees are made detectable and
verifiable through a suit of misbehavior report mechanisms
implemented in the Ethereum Smart Contracts and any verified
misbehavior incurs monetary penalty on the violator. We
implement the proposed approach using the contract-oriented
programming language Solidity [42] and test it on the
Ethereum official test network rinkeby [36] with Ethereum
official Go implementation Geth [20]. Our implementation
and experimental evaluation that the proposed approach is
effective and the protocol has a low gas cost and time overhead
associated with it.
II. OVERVIEW OF TIMED EXECUTION IN ETHEREUM
In this section, we first present the preliminaries of the
Ethereum smart contract platform [46] and describe the
challenges involved in implementing timed execution of smart
contracts over Ethereum. We then present the key ideas behind
the proposed solution and introduce the organization of the
proposed protocol and discuss the security challenges and
potential attacks encountered in the proposed approach.
A. Preliminaries
A blockchain represents a decentralized and distributed
public digital ledger that guarantees that the records stored
in it cannot be tampered without compromising a majority
of nodes in the network [32]. Then, a smart contract is a
piece of program code stored in a blockchain and it usually
consists of multiple functions. In the leading smart contract
platform Ethereum [46], there are two types of accounts,
namely External Owned Accounts (EOAs) controlled by
private keys and Contract Accounts (CAs) for storing smart
contract code. An Ethereum node can create as many as
EOAs and then use EOAs to create CAs by deploying smart
contracts. However, since smart contracts are passive, their
execution must be invoked through either a transaction sent
by an EOA or a message sent from a CA. As a result, the
transactions/messages, as well as function inputs inside them,
are all recorded by the Ethereum blockchain, which makes the
function outputs deterministic because all Ethereum nodes can
execute the function with the same inputs and gets the same
outputs. In Ethereum, to deploy a smart contract (i.e., CA) or
call a smart contract function changing any data on blockchain,
one needs to pay for Gas [46]. Gas can be exchanged with
Ether, the cryptocurrency used in Ethereum, and Ether can be
exchanged with real money.
B. Problem statement
The Ethereum blockchain platform [46] can be viewed as
a giant global computer as shown in Figure 1. If a user
creates a EOA and uses the EOA to send a transaction
with inputs x1 and x2 to call function f(x1, x2) of a smart
contract C at time t1, function f(x1, x2) will be executed
instantly and the inputs x1 and x2 will be made public.
This is acceptable if the user just wants to reveal x1 and
x2 at time t1. However, if the user needs to reveal x1 and
x2 during a future execution time window we, sending the
transaction at t1 will not work. For example, Bob may want
to make function reveal(amount, nonce) of a sealed-bid
auction smart contract [47] be executed during a future
execution time window we. Then, sending the transaction out
at t1 will make his bid value be known to all other bidders
immediately, which violates his privacy requirements.
C. Privacy-preserving timed execution
To support privacy-preserving timed execution of smart
contracts, the transaction calling function f(x1, x2) must be
sent during the prescribed execution time window we while
inputs x1 and x2 should not be revealed before we. Our
proposed protocol for supporting privacy-preserving timed
execution is implemented as two smart contracts, namely a
unique scheduler contract Cs managing all schedule requests
of users in Ethereum and a proxy contract Cp deployed by
each user having a schedule request. At the time of setting
a timed execution, the protocol requires the user to (1) store
Fig. 1: At time t1, Bob wants to schedule function
reveal(amount,nonce) in contract SealedBidAuction [47] to be
executed during a future time window we
schedule information, including a cryptographic keccak-256
hash [8] of function inputs x1 and x2 to the scheduler contract
Cs, (2) deploy a proxy contract Cp and (3) employ a group
of EOAs as trustees. The main functionality of the proxy
contract Cp is implemented through a function execute() in
it. Once Cp receives a transaction during we with the desired
inputs x1 and x2 verified through their hashes in scheduler
contract Cs, the function execute() will immediately send
a message calling the target function f(x1, x2) with inputs
x1 and x2. The trustees are in charge of storing inputs
x1 and x2 off the blockchain before the execution time
window we and they send a transaction with the inputs to the
proxy contract Cp during we. The terms of the decentralized
secret trust created by the user as a settlor, namely what
the trustees can or cannot do, are programmed as functions
in smart contracts Cs and Cp. Each trustee needs to pay
a security deposit d (i.e., Ether) to the scheduler contract
Cs and any detectable misbehavior of this trustee makes
the deposit be confiscated. The security deposit serves as an
economic deterrence model for enforcing behaviors of peers
in the blockchain network [5], [31]. Finally, after the trustees
have sent a transaction with inputs x1 and x2 to the proxy
contract Cp during we, they can withdraw both their deposit
and remuneration paid by the user from the scheduler contract
Cs. In the example of Figure 1, at t1, Bob stores hash of
inputs amount and nonce to Cs, deploys Cp and employs a
group of trustees. These trustees, after signing an agreement
with Bob, are in charge of revealing the asset amount and
nonce to the beneficiary, proxy contract Cp, during we. During
the execution time window we, after the trustees have sent a
transaction with inputs amount and nonce to Cp, the function
execute() in Cp can trigger reveal() in the SealedBidAuction
contract through SealedBidAuction.reveal() and also
unlock trustees’ deposit and remuneration in Cs through
withdrawPermission().
D. Protocol overview
The proposed protocol consists of four components:
Trustee application: At any point in time, an EOA can apply to
Cs for getting added into a trustee candidate pool maintained
Fig. 2: Protocol overview
by Cs by submitting its working time window and paying a
security deposit. During the working time window, the EOA
should be able to connect with Ethereum to send transactions
to the proxy contract Cp. In the example shown in Figure 2,
we notice that ten EOAs joined the pool. The public pool
then makes the entire network learn that this EOA can provide
services during its declared working times.
User schedule: During setup time window ws, a user can
schedule a transaction by registering the schedule to scheduler
contract Cs, deploying a proxy contract Cp, and secretly
selecting trustees from the pool. The selected trustees should
keep the function inputs privately before the execution time
window we while revealing them during we to make the target
function be executed. In Figure 2, during setup window ws,
the user informed the schedule with the scheduler contract Cs
and deployed the proxy contract Cp. Then, the user randomly
selected three EOAs from the pool as trustees and signed
agreements with the trustees through private channels created
by the whisper protocol [45]. Any data exchanged through the
whisper channels are encrypted and can only be viewed by the
data sender and data recipient.
Function Execution: During execution time window we, the
selected trustees submit the function inputs to the proxy
contract Cp through transactions, which triggers Cp to verify
correctness of function inputs with Cs and then call the
scheduled function in the target contract Ct. In Figure 2,
during we, the trustees submitted stored data to proxy contract
Cp. After verifying the received data with the hashes stored
in scheduler contract Cs, Cp called the function in Ct.
Misbehavior report: During the entire process, trustees may
perform several types of misbehaviors violating the protocol,
such as secretly disclosing stored data before we or rejecting
to submit stored data during we. To tackle these issues, the
protocol involves several misbehavior report mechanisms that
allow any witness of a misbehavior to report it to the scheduler
contract Cs and earn a component of the deposit paid by the
suspect trustee once the report is verified to be true.
E. Security challenges and attack models
The proposed mechanism encounters several critical
security challenges, which can be roughly classified using two
attack models.
Time difference attacks: The time difference attack happens
when an adversary aims at obtaining the function inputs at a
time point td earlier than the execution time window we so
that he can leverage the time difference between td and we to
achieve his purpose. There are two key methods to launch a
time difference attack.
• Trustee identity disclosure: In user schedule component
of the protocol, trustees are secretly selected by user
U . Therefore, from the perspective of EOAs besides the
selected trustees and user U , all EOAs in network with
working time windows satisfying U ’s requirement have
equal chance to be selected by U , thus protecting the
identifications of selected trustees with highest entropy
and uncertainty. However, a trustee, after being selected,
may announce its identity to the public to seek trade
with potential adversaries about the stored data. To prevent
such misbehavior, the proposed protocol employs a trustee
identity disclosure report mechanism in misbehavior report
component of the protocol, which forces a trustee to disclose
its identity with the sacrifice of the confiscation of its
security deposit.
• Advance disclosure: A trustee may choose to voluntarily
disclose the stored data to the entire network without seeking
bribery. To penalize such misbehavior, an advance disclosure
report mechanism is employed in the misbehavior report
component, which makes any trustee disclosing its stored
data in advance lose its security deposit.
Execution failure attack: The execution failure attack
happens when an adversary aims at making the execution of
the target function fail during the execution time window we.
There are two key methods to launch this attack.
• Absent trustee: A trustee may become absent during the
execution time window we, which makes its stored data get
lost. To prevent this type of misbehavior, the user schedule
component of protocol requires each selected trustee to
provide a signature, which will only be revealed along with
the function inputs during we. Therefore, before we, the
identities of trustees are kept secret. In contrast, during
we, the identities become public so that any present trustee
can report an absent trustee through the absent trustee
report mechanism in the misbehavior report component of
protocol, which penalizes any absent trustee by confiscating
its security deposit.
• Fake submission: A trustee may submit fake stored data
to the proxy contract Cp during we, which may cause
the restoration of the function inputs to fail. The protocol
handles this type of misbehavior using the fake submission
report mechanism in the misbehavior report component of
protocol, which confiscates violator’s security deposit if its
submission is proved to be fake.
III. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we present the proposed protocol organized
along the four components introduced in Section II-D.
A. Trustee application
The first component trustee application allows EOAs that
want to earn remuneration through the trustee job to register to
the scheduler contract Cs and make their information public.
There are three key steps in this component. We note that a
step with a gray bullet (e.g., 1 ) refers to an off-chain action
not recorded by blockchain while a step with a white bullet
(e.g., 2) refers to an on-chain action recorded by blockchain.
We will distinguish off-chain and on-chain steps with the two
bullet types in all four components of the protocol.
Trustee application
Input: scheduler contract Cs
Apply:
1 An Ethereum node creates a new EOA.
2. This EOA applies to the scheduler contract Cs for being
added into the trustee candidate pool by submitting a public
key, a whisper key, working time window, a security deposit
and a beneficiary address.
3. The scheduler contract Cs verifies the application and accept
the application if all required data has been submitted.
Step 1: Each trustee candidate should be a newly generated
EOA, which only has an amount of Ether (the cryptocurrency
in Ethereum) that will be submitted to the scheduler contract
Cs as security deposit d in step 2. No additional Ether should
be left because we will need the account to make its account
private key public during execution time window we.
Step 2-3: An EOA should apply for the trustee candidate by
sending a transaction to Cs with the five listed information.
• The public key will later be used by user U in step 8 of
user schedule component to generate onions [12]. Here, the
term onion refers to the output of iteratively encrypting data
with multiple public keys.
• The whisper key will later be used by user U in user
schedule component to establish private channel with this
EOA through whisper protocol [45].
• The working time window will be used by user U in step
6 and 10 of user schedule component to select trustees
satisfying U ’s requirements (i.e., execution time window).
• The security deposit is a fixed amount of Ether hard-coded
in scheduler contract Cs. Once being submitted to Cs, the
deposit can only be withdrawn at the end of EOA’s working
time window, if there is no misbehavior reported through
report mechanisms in misbehavior report components.
• Finally, the protocol needs the EOA to make its account
private key public in function execution component, so the
beneficiary address will be the address of a safe EOA to
receive deposit and remuneration withdraw.
B. User schedule
The second component user schedule prescribes how a
user should set a schedule through three key operations,
namely deploying a proxy contract (step 3), registering the
schedule information to scheduler contract Cs (step 4) and
implementing a two-round trustee selection (step 5-13).
For the illustration of the protocol in step 5 to 13, we will
use the example shown in Figure 3.
User schedule
Input: scheduler contract Cs, target contract Ct
Initialization:
1 User U decides function inputs IN , execution time window
we, secret sharing parameters (m,n), number of layers l, a
256-bit secret key key and a 256-bit random number RU .
2 User U computes the remuneration r.
3. User U deploys proxy contract Cp to the network.
4. User U registers the schedule to scheduler contract Cs with
(we,m, n, l, C
addr
p , r) and receive a schedule ID sid.
5 User U splits key to n shares through (m,n) secret sharing.
First-round trustee selection:
6 User U randomly selects n(l − 1) trustees and sends each
trustee a (sid, tid), where tid refers to a non-repeated ID in
the range of [0, n(l − 1)) assigned to the trustee.
7 Each selected trustee T then does the following:
7.1. Verify (Uaddr, sid, tid, we, r) with Cs.
7.2. Generate a 256-bit random number RT .
7.3. Take keccak256 hash h(T addr, RT ).
7.4. Sign (Uaddr, sid, tid, h(T addr, RT )) with T ’s private
key, which gives signature vrs = (v, r, s).
7.5. Send h(T addr, RT ) and vrs back to U .
8 User U encrypts shares to onions with public keys of
selected trustees.
9. User U takes keccak256 hash h(onion) of each onion and
submits the hash values to Cs.
Second-round trustee selection:
10 User U randomly selects n trustees and sends each trustee a
(sid, tid, onion), where tid is non-repeated in [n(l−1), nl).
11 Each selected trustee T follows step 7, but in addition
verifying received onion with h(onion) in Cs.
Ciphertext and hash disclosure:
12 User U encrypts (IN, vrs,RU ) with key and make
E(key, (IN, vrs,RU )) public.
13. User U submits keccak256 hash h(IN,RU ) and each
trustee’s h(T addr, RT ) to Cs.
Step 2: The total remuneration that should be paid by user
U is r = nlrt + re, where rd is a fixed per trustee
remuneration hard-coded in Cs and re is a fixed amount of
reward hard-coded in Cm paying to the first trustee calling
execute() in Ct during we. Both rd and re can only be
withdrawn by trustees after the end of execution time window
we.
Step 4: After the schedule has been registered in Cs, the
on-chain schedule information cannot be modified. Therefore,
the information can be used by trustee candidates later in step 7
and 11 to verify the information transmitted through off-chain
whisper channels from user U .
Step 5: The Shamir secret sharing scheme [39] with parameter
(m,n) can split the key to n shares. Later, any m shares
among the n can be combined to restore the key while even
m−1 shares fail to do it. Therefore, even if some shares are
compromised, the compromised shares may be insufficient
to restore the key before execution window we while the rest
shares may still be sufficient to restore the key during we.
In the example of Figure 2, we set (m,n) = (2, 3), so three
shares are generated from key after splitting.
Step 6-13: The design of two-round trustee selection
implements the decentralized secret trust. The trustees selected
Fig. 3: User schedule example
in the first round should agree the user encrypt the shares with
their public keys for multiple layers so that the shares become
onions [12] and harder to be compromised. Then, the trustees
selected in the second round should take charge of storing
these onions. Later, during we, once both the private keys of
the first-round trustees and onions stored by the second-round
trustees are made public, the key can be restored to decrypt
the function inputs. The process offers following additional
security features:
• The identities of selected trustees are kept private. In these
steps, each trustee only communicates with the user through
a whisper channel and all information that needs to be made
public are announced by the user (step 9,12,13). Therefore,
the identity of each trustee is only known to the user. This
feature helps in suppressing collusion among trustees.
• The identities of selected trustees are verifiable and only
the trustees can pass the verification. To be verified as a
specific trustee, both the trustee’s address T addr and the
nonce RT need to be submitted to Cs and their hash should
match with the one submitted by user in step 13. Since RT
is created by the trustee, only the trustee has the ability to
pass the verification. This feature also helps in suppressing
collusion among trustees. We will discuss it in detail later
in misbehavior report component.
• The identities of selected trustees are undeniable. The user
has signatures of the trustees (step 7,11) and the encrypted
signatures are made public in step 12. Therefore, once key
is restored during we, the decrypted signatures can reveal
the identities of all trustees. This feature helps in detecting
absent trustees who disappear during we.
• The trustees are also protected against adversaries. It may be
insecure to only allow users to publicly speak. Such a user
may fabricate information and make trustees lose security
deposit. To protect trustees from such users. Once a user has
registered a schedule in step 4, the submitted information
cannot be changed. Then, in step 7 and 11, each trustee
can check the information before sending a signature to the
user. This is also the main reason that we need two rounds.
In step 11, the second-round trustees should first verify the
correctness of the onions with the hash submitted by the
user in step 9 and then provide signatures.
In the example of Figure 3, six trustees (T1-T6) are selected
by user U in the first round and their six public keys encrypt
each of the three shares with two layers, thus turning the
shares into two-layer onions. Then, three trustees (T7-T9)
are selected by user U in the second round to store the three
onions. Finally, U ends the schedule by making the ciphertext
public and submitting all hash values to Cs.
C. Function Execution
The third component of the protocol, function execution
indicates how the trustees selected in user schedule component
should collaboratively reveal the function inputs during
execution window we and send a transaction with the function
inputs to the proxy contract Cp through two phases, namely
submission (step 1-2) and execution (step 3-6).
Function Execution
Input: scheduler contract Cs
Submission (first half of we):
1. Each trustee T verifies its identity with h(T addr, RT ) by
submitting RT to Cs.
2. Each trustee T submits onion or its private key to Cs, where
onion should be verified with h(onion).
Execution (second half of we):
3 Any trustee T can get shares by decrypting onions with
the private keys.
4 Any trustee T can get key by combing any m shares.
5 Any trustee T can get (IN, vrs,RU ) by doing
D(key,E(key, (IN, vrs,RU ))).
6. Any trustee T can submit (IN,RU ) to proxy contract Cp,
where (IN,RU ) can be verified with h(IN,RU ) in Cs and
the correct function inputs IN will trigger Cp to call the
target contract Ct.
Step 1-2: The submission phase indicates the first half of
execution window we, during which the protocol requires
first-round and second-round trustees to submit their private
keys and stored onions, respectively. To submit either a private
key or an onion, a trustee should also provide the nonce RT
generated in step 7 and 11 of user schedule so that its identity
can be verified with h(T addr, RT ).
Step 3-6: The execution phase refers to the second half of
execution window we. Since both onions and private keys
have been submitted, during this phase, any verified trustee
should be able to turn onions back to shares. Then, based on
Shamir secret sharing scheme, any m shares can be combined
to restore the key created by user S in step 1 of user schedule.
After getting the key, any trustee is able to decrypt the
encrypted (IN, vrs,RU ). Finally, before the end of we, a
verified trustee, after obtaining function inputs IN and nonce
RU , should send proxy contract Cp a transaction with both
IN and RU . Then, Cp will immediately verify received IN
and RU with h(IN,RU ) in scheduler contract Cs. If both of
them are correct, Cp immediately send a message with IN to
the target contract Ct to call the scheduled function.
D. Misbehavior report
The misbehavior report represents the final component of
the protocol and involves four types of misbehaviors that will
result in the violator’s security deposit being confiscated. All
these misbehaviors are witnessable and the protocol rewards
the reporter of a misbehavior a component of the violator’s
security deposit as an incentive while sending the rest of the
violator’s security deposit to the user.
Misbehavior report
Input: scheduler contract Cs
Trustee identity disclosure report:
1. Before the start of execution time we, any EOA can report
a trustee identity disclosure misbehavior by submitting the
nonce RT of the violator to scheduler contract Cs.
2. If h(T addr, RT ) using the submitted RT is same as the one
in Cs, the misbehavior is verified.
Advance disclosure report:
3. Before the start of execution time we, any EOA can report
an advance disclosure misbehavior by submitting the private
key belonging to the violator to scheduler contract Cs.
4. If the public key derived from that private key is same as the
violator’s public key in Cs, the misbehavior is verified.
Absent trustee report:
5. After step 5 in function execution, any trustee can report
an absent trustee misbehavior to scheduler contract Cs by
submitting the signature vrs of the absent trustee.
6. The address of the violator can be derived through T =
sigV erify((Uaddr, sid, tid, h(T addr, RT )), vrs).
Fake submission report:
7. After step 2 in function execution, any trustee can report a
fake submission misbehavior to scheduler contract Cs if the
trustee finds a submitted private key is incorrect.
8. If the public key derived from that private key is different
from violator’s public key in Cs, the misbehavior is verified.
Trustee identity disclosure report: This report mechanism is
designed to handle the trustee identity disclosure misbehavior
presented in Section II-E. Before the start of execution window
we, a trustee may choose to reveal its identity to seek collusion.
To prove its identity, the violator has to reveal the nonce RT
created by itself in step 7/11 of user schedule so that its
identity can become verifiable through h(T addr, RT ) in Cs.
However, with this report mechanism, any EOA, after knowing
RT before we, can report it to Cs to earn reward.
Advance disclosure report: The advance disclosure
misbehavior introduced in Section II-E can be handled using
this report mechanism. Before the start of we, a round-one
trustee may choose to disclose its private key, which may
help an adversary to decrypt onions to shares, restore key
and obtain IN before the start of we. However, with this
report mechanism, any EOA, after knowing violator’s private
key before we, can betray the violator by reporting it to Cs.
Absent trustee report: This report mechanism handles the
absent trustee misbehavior described in Section II-E. Any
trustee may become absent during we, thus increasing the
failure chance of schedule. With this report mechanism, any
trustee, after obtaining signatures of all other trustees in step
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Fig. 4: Schedule success rate when 5% of trustees perform
misbehaviors inadvertently
5 of function execution, can locally verify attendance of all
other trustees, thus being able to report absent trustees to Cs.
Fake submission report: Finally, the design of fake
submission report aims at dealing with the fake submission
misbehavior presented in Section II-E. In step 2 of function
execution, a submitted private key may not be the right one.
Any trustee can locally verify a private key submitted by a
suspect trustee through deriving the corresponding public key
from the private key and comparing it with the public key
submitted by that suspect trustee during trustee application,
thus becoming able to report violators to Cs.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Next, we analyze the security guarantees of the proposed
approach based on the rational adversary model. Recently, it
has been widely recognized that assuming an adversary to
be semi-honest or malicious is either too weak or too strong
and hence modeling adversaries with rationality is a relevant
choice in several attack scenarios [13], [34]. Informally, a
semi-honest adversary follows the prescribed protocol but tries
to glean more information from available intermediate results
while a malicious adversary can take any action for launching
attacks [21]. A rational adversary lies in the middle of the
two types. That is, rational adversaries are self-interest-driven,
they choose to violate protocols, such as colluding with other
parties, only when doing so brings them a higher profit. In
this paper, in order to design our approach with strong and
practical security guarantees, we model all EOAs to be rational
adversaries without assuming any of them to be honest or
semi-honest.
Without countermeasures, such rational adversaries, after
being selected by user as trustees, may perform four types
of misbehaviors introduced in Section II-D, including trustee
identity disclosure, advance disclosure, absent trustee and fake
submission. As per the four misbehavior report mechanisms
designed in misbehavior report component, as long as the key
can be restored during the execution time window we, any of
the four types of misbehaviors will lead to confiscation of
the violator’s deposit. To prevent restoration of the key so
that misbehaviors can be performed in free, a certain fraction
of trustees must collude to not submit their stored data (i.e.,
onion or private key) together. However, due to trustee identity
disclosure report mechanism in misbehavior report, revealing
Component Step Function Purpose
Schedule
5 share split key to shares
7,11 ecsign sign data with private key
8 encrypt encrypt shares to onions
9,13 soliditySha3 compute keccak256 hash
Execute 3 combine combine shares to key4 decrypt decrypt onions to shares
TABLE I: Key off-chain functions in node.js, share()
and combine() are in secrets.js [38], ecsign() is in
ethereumjs-util [16], encrypt() and decrypt() are in
eth-ecies [14], soliditySha3() is in web3-utils [44]
trustee identity to other EOAs means losing deposit, so such
a collusion will not happen among rational adversaries.
It is possible that a rational adversary performs misbehaviors
inadvertently, such as forgetting providing the service or losing
EOA’s private key. Such kinds of inadvertent misbehaviors
lead to same results of intentionally performing absent trustee
misbehavior. If we denote the percentage of EOAs performing
inadvertent misbehaviors as pIM , the success rate of a
schedule with parameters (l,m, n) will be computed through
the Cumulative Distribution Function of Binomial distribution,
namely SR = 1 − ∑ni=n−m+1 (ni)P i(1 − P )n−i, where
P = 1− (1− pIM )l represents the probability that one share
is lost. In Figure 4, we present the computed schedule success
rate when 5% of trustees perform misbehaviors inadvertently.
Specifically, in Figure 4(a), by fixing n to 5 and changing
m from 1 to 5, it shows that a smaller m, namely lower
threshold for restoring key, performs higher resistance against
inadvertent misbehaviors. By further changing l from 3 to 5,
we can find that a smaller l offers better resistance against
inadvertent misbehaviors. Then, in Figure 4(b), n is increased
to 10. The increment of n enhances the resistance against
inadvertent misbehaviors when m and l do not change.
Thus, larger l and n while smaller m help maintaining high
resistance against inadvertent misbehaviors.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
In this section, we present the implementation of the
proposed protocol and discuss the experimental evaluation of
the proposed mechanism in Ethereum.
A. Implementation of protocol
We first introduce the implementation setup and then
present both key off-chain functions in node.js and on-chain
functions in Solidity [42] and demonstrate how they work in
practice. After that, we present two test instances used in our
experimental evaluation.
Setup: We programmed the smart contracts in Solidity [42],
the most commonly used smart contract programming
language, deployed them to the Ethereum official test network
rinkeby [36] and tested them with Ethereum official Go
implementation Geth [20]. Our experiments are performed on
an Intel Core i7 2.70GHz PC with 16GB RAM.
Implemented functions: The protocol primarily relies on 6
off-chain functions shown in Table I and 15 on-chain functions
Component Step Function Purpose
Apply 2,3 newCandidate join candidate pool
Schedule
4 newUser register as a new user
4 newSchedule initialize a new schedule
9 setOnion submit hashes of onions
13 setTrustee submit hashes of trustees
Execute
1,2 submitPrivkey submit private key
1,2 submitOnion submit onion
6 execute execute the target contract
7 withdrawD withdraw security deposit
7 withdrawR withdraw remuneration
Report
1,2 identityReport report identity disclosure
3,4 advanceReport report advance disclosure
5,6 absentReport report absent trustee
7,8 fakeReport report fake submission
2,4,6,8 withdrawA withdraw report award
TABLE II: Key on-chain functions in solidity, the three colored
functions are in proxy contract Cp, the rest of the functions
are in scheduler contract Cs
shown in Table II. In both the tables, we show the components
and steps where each function works in protocol. For example,
function share() is used in step 5 of user schedule component
to split key to n shares using Shamir secret sharing [39].
• Trustee application: Any EOA in the network can
invoke newCandidate() to join the trustee candidate pool
maintained by scheduler contract Cs.
• User schedule: Any EOA can invoke newUser() to be
recorded as a user and then set up new schedule through
newSchedule(). Then, during whisper communication with
trustees, h(onion) should be submitted to Cs through
setOnion() while h(T addr, RT ) and h(IN,RU ) should
be submitted to Cs through setTrustee(). Meanwhile, the
generation of shares, signatures, onions and hash values
are completed by share(), ecsign(), encrypt(), soliditySha3()
in node.js, respectively.
• Function execution: A trustee can submit private key
and onion through submitPrivkey() and submitOnion(),
respectively. Then, after decrypting onions to shares
through decrypt() and combining shares to key through
combine(), any trustee has the ability to make the target
function be executed through execute(). Finally, after the
execution window is over, trustees can withdraw deposit
and remuneration through withdrawD() and withdrawR(),
respectively.
• Misbehavior report: The four types of report mechanisms
are implemented by identityReport(), advanceReport(),
absentReport() and fakeReport(), respectively. Then, after
the execution window is over, reporters can withdraw reward
through withdrawA().
Test instance: We design two test instances A and B:
Instance l m n 5% IM
A 3 2 5 99.82%
B 4 4 10 99.95%
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Fig. 5: Gas cost
Instance A employs 15 trustees while instance B employs
40 trustees. As a result, instance B has higher schedule
success rate under 5% inadvertent misbehaviors (IM). In
both instance A and B, we use the SealedBidAuction
contract [47] as the target contract Ct and we assumed
user’s goal was to schedule a transaction calling function
reveal(amount, nonce). Specifically, we designed an input
parameter time to simulate the time during testing.
B. Experimental evaluation
We use the presented test instances to experimentally
evaluate the performance of the smart contracts, namely the
gas cost and time overhead of each function presented in
Table II.
Gas cost: Gas is spent in Ethereum for deploying smart
contracts or calling functions. The gas costs of functions in
Table II for instance A and B are shown in Figure 5(a) and
Figure 5(b), respectively. For ease of presentation, results are
grouped into four clusters. Each cluster represents a protocol
component and contains a group of functions following their
order in Table II. As can be seen, most functions cost very
little. Specifically, among the fifteen functions, eight cost lower
than 105 gas and eleven cost lower than 2× 105 gas. Among
the rest four functions, both advanceReport() and fakeReport()
cost around 8.5×105 because the two functions need to derive
public key from private key on chain. Gas costs of the last two
functions, namely setOnion() and setTrustee(), change with
n and nl, respectively. From instance A to B, l increases from
3 to 4 and n increases from 5 to 10. As a result, gas cost of
setOnion() increases from 1.40× 105 to 2.55× 105 and gas
cost of settrustee() increases from 7.17× 105 to 1.87× 106.
To complete a schedule, some functions need to be invoked
for multiple times. Below, we show the number of times that
each function needs to be invoked in a single schedule when
there is no report needed:
Function No. Function No. Function No.
newCandidate nl setTrustee 1 execute 1
newSschedule 1 submitPrivkey n(l − 1) withdrawD nl
setOnion 1 submitOnion n withdrawR nl
Besides, the gas cost of deploying proxy contract Cp is
about 1.33 × 106. Therefore, the total gas costs of instance
A and B are 7.60 × 106 and 1.72 × 107, respectively. Both
gas price and Ether price keeps dramatically swinging [17].
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Fig. 6: Time overhead
For example, based on prices of date 12/5/2016, instance A
and B cost $1.2 and $2.72, respectively. However, based on
prices of date 10/29/2017, the two instances cost $22.8 and
$51.6, respectively. As can be seen, the monetary cost of a
timed-execution service is highly influenced by the fluctuation
of cryptocurrency market, which may be a common limitation
of cryptocurrency-based applications.
Time overhead: The time overheads of functions in Table II
for instance A and B are shown in Figure 6(a) and Figure 6(b),
respectively. All results are averaged for 100 tests. Among
the fifteen functions, fourteen functions spend 0-200ms. It
is the function setTrustee() that spends more time to record
information of all the trustees to the blockchain. Specifically,
setTrustee() spends 375ms for instance A while 881ms for
instance B as there are more trustees in instance B.
VI. RELATED WORK
The problem of revealing private data at a release time
in future has been researched for more than two decades.
The problem was first described by May as timed-release
cryptography in 1992 [29] and has intrigued many researchers
since then. There are four sets of representative solutions in
the literature. The first category of solutions was designed
to make data recipients solve a mathematical puzzle, called
time-lock puzzle, before reading the messages [9], [10], [37].
The time-lock puzzle can only be solved with sequential
operations, thus making multiple computers no better than
a single computer. This solution suffers from two key
drawbacks. First, the time taken to solve a puzzle may
be different on different computers. Second, the puzzle
computation is associated with a significant computation cost,
which does not lead to a scalable cost-effective solution.
The second group of solutions relies on a third party, also
known as a time server, to release the protected information
at the release time in future. The information, sometimes
called time trapdoors, can be used by recipients to decrypt
the encrypted message [23], [37]. However, the time server
in this model has to be trusted to not collude with recipients
so that encrypted messages cannot be entered before release
time. This restriction makes this set of solutions involve a
single point of trust. The third set of approaches studied
the problem in the context of Distributed Hash Table (DHT)
networks [25], [26]. The idea behind these techniques is
to leverage the scalability and distributed features of DHT
P2P networks to make message securely hidden before
release time. Finally, the last direction uses blockchains as a
reference time clock correctness guaranteed by the distributed
network [22], [28]. By combining witness encryption [19] with
blockchain, one can leverage the computation power of PoW
in blockchain to decrypt a message after a certain number
of new blocks have been generated. However, the current
implementation of witness encryption is far from practical,
which requires an astronomical decryption time estimated to
be 2100 seconds [28]. Recent work has studied the problem
of supporting self-emerging data in blockchain networks [27].
It allows the encrypted private data to travel through a long
path within a blockchain network and appear at the prescribed
release time. However, unlike the proposed work in this paper,
this approach supports only self-emergence of data and fails
to support timed invocation of smart contract functions which
is crucial for supporting timed executions in decentralized
applications on blockchain-based smart contract platforms.
Besides the above mentioned solutions, there are two tools
that support timed execution of transactions, however, they
do not protect sensitive inputs. Ethereum Alarm Clock [1]
allows a client to deploy a request contract to the Ethereum
network at time A with a reward and if any account is
interested in the reward, the account can invoke the request
contract at a prescribed Time B to make the scheduled
transaction be sent to earn the reward. However, this scheme
neither protects sensitive inputs nor guarantees the transaction
execution. Oraclize [4] is a blockchain oracle service that
takes the role of a trusted third party (TTP) to execute the
transaction on behalf of the client at a future time point. The
limitations of of this scheme include both the centralization
brought by the TTP and the lack of protection of sensitive
inputs. To the best of our knowledge, the approach proposed
in this paper is the first decentralized solution for enabling
users of decentralized applications to schedule timed execution
of transactions without revealing sensitive inputs before an
execution time window chosen by the users.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we developed a new decentralized
privacy-preserving timed execution mechanism that allows
users of Ethereum-based decentralized applications to
schedule timed transactions without revealing sensitive inputs
before an execution time window chosen by the users. The
proposed approach involves no centralized party and allows
users to go offline at their discretion after scheduling a
timed transaction. The timed execution mechanism protects
the sensitive inputs by employing a set of trustees from the
decentralized blockchain network to enable the inputs to be
revealed only during the execution time. We implemented the
proposed approach using Solidity and evaluated the system on
the Ethereum official test network. Our theoretical analysis
and extensive experiments validate the security properties and
demonstrate the low gas cost and low time overhead associated
with the proposed approach.
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